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Chapter 3 - Access to and usage of input factors by 




Agriculture continues to be of vital importance for the world’s least developed 
countries in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), employment and export 
revenues (World Bank 2007; Gollin and Rogerson 2014). Approximately one-fifth 
of the world population are estimated to derive their incomes at least partly from 
farming, while another two-fifth are estimated to depend on agriculture for their 
livelihoods, though they do not directly engage in farming. The majority of these 
people reside in developing countries (Alston and Pardey 2014). An increase in 
income in farming would benefit hundreds of millions of smallholders. Yet 
resource constraints that poor smallholders are confronted with prevent them 
from appropriating created value in supply chains (Kaplinsky 2006). To benefit 
more from their farming activities farmers need to act entrepreneurially. The 
World Bank (2007) therefore speaks of farmers as entrepreneurs and their 
cooperatives as businesses. Collectively, it is argued, farmers are capable of 
creating business-like organizations that have better access to input factors and 
markets. 
In the field of development studies the potential of collective action to address 
development issues has been subject to a wide range of research topics (Adhikari 
and Lovett 2006; Bernard and Spielman 2009; Dasgupta and Beard 2007; Desai 
and Joshi 2014; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Naidu 2009; Poteete and Ostrom 2004; 
Ruttan 2008; Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Munshi and Parikh 1994). The 
theoretical potential of collective action is often acknowledged, yet in practice, for 
a variety of reasons, this potential often remains unrealized. Similarly the World 
Bank (2007) argues that farmer organizations have large potential to benefit 
their member farmers, yet often fail to do so in developing countries, particularly 
in Africa. Numerous studies have been published on how collective action would 
allow farmers to access input factors and markets which they cannot access 
individually (cf. Bernard and Spielman 2009; Barham and Chitemi 2009; 
Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, and Dohrn 2009; Fischer and Qaim 2012; 
Desai and Joshi 2014). In the current chapter we study the potential of members 
of farmer cooperatives in Ethiopia to access farming input factors and utilize 
them efficiently to the end of creating profits for the farmers. We compare 
members of cooperatives to farmers who are not member and find that while 
members and non-members reach comparable profit levels, they do so in different 




less efficiently than non-members with the exception of one input factor, namely 
speculating on price. Being able to benefit from speculating on price, however, is 
more the result of government policy favoring cooperatives rather than the result 
of cooperative management and deployment of input factors. In the current 
chapter we contribute to existing research in that we are one of the first to 
provide evidence based on quantitative data that members of cooperatives do not 
make as efficient use of input factors as do non-members. In addition we 
designed our research such that we do not only collect data on the three 
traditional input factors often used in agricultural economics research (land, 
labor, and capital), but include other input factors as well and measure them in a 
novel, reliable, and objective way. 
We proceed as follows. We continue below with reviewing literature on collective 
action and the importance of collective action to farmers. We discuss the context 
specific to Ethiopia. Next we discuss our data and methods, provide results and 
finally a discussion and conclusion. In the conclusion we provide policy 
recommendations. 
3.2 Literature 
Economies of scale and scope motivate farmers to organize in cooperatives and 
bundle assets. Cooperatives are powerful forms of organization for farmers but 
due to their nature of an organization owned by a collective of individual firms, 
are subject to challenges of collective action (Van Bekkum 2001; Beverland 2007; 
Olson 1965).  
Cooperatives have not been unequivocally successful in Africa despite the 
continent’s continued reliance on agriculture for its GDP, export revenues, and 
employment (World Bank 2007). Nonetheless the World Bank (2007: 8) argues 
that modern agriculture in developing countries “is led by private entrepreneurs 
in extensive value chains linking producers to consumers and including many 
entrepreneurial smallholders supported by their organizations.” While in practice 
cooperatives fail to live up to their potential, their theoretical potential is still 
sufficient reason to pursue well-functioning cooperatives.  
For farmers it is important to cooperate with others farmers in an effort to 
acquire, accumulate, develop, bundle, and deploy input factors. Such bundles of 
input factors can be developed by members contributing heterogeneous yet 
complementary input factors or homogeneous input factors resulting in 
economies of scale (Olson 1965; Wincent et al. 2010; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, 
and Borza 2000; Araujo Dubois, and Gadde 2003; Agarwal, Croson, and Mahoney 
2010; Beverland 2007). As a collective farmers can reduce transaction costs by 
supplying bulk to the market and collectively buying inputs, they can access 




collectively invest in capital-intensive technologies and research and 
development, and finally they can increase their representativeness by means of 
lobbying (World Bank 2007; Berdegué 2001; Mesquita and Lazzarini 2008). 
While collective action offers opportunities to benefit from cooperation, it is 
subject to a variety of challenges resulting from individuals with individual 
interests pursuing a common interest in a collective. Unless cooperatives meet 
conditions for success, collectives are unlikely to succeed. For a collective to 
succeed complementary heterogeneous contributions are required as well as 
homogeneous contributions that result in economies of scale. Such contributions 
will result when members expect that individual gains exceed individual 
contributions. A problem with members aiming for individual gains larger than 
individual contributions is that distribution of relational rents among members 
proportionate to contributions may be neglected. As long as individual gains are 
larger than individual contributions, there is an incentive to participate in a 
collective even if other members are free-riding. As such Olson (1965) argues that 
members contributing nothing or little to a collective may benefit 
disproportionately as compared to members contributing a lot. He refers to this 
phenomenon as ‘the exploitation of the large by the small’. The larger the group, 
the more likely that such free-riding results. Wincent et al. (2010: 45) hereby 
refer to the “paradox of group size”. The paradox, or trade-off, is that the larger 
the group of firms that cooperates, the more input factors are accumulated, yet, 
at the same time, the larger the group, the more difficult it is to exploit the input 
factors.  
Problems associated with opportunistic behavior in groups can, at least partially, 
be overcome through governance of the group. First and foremost it is important 
that members, though heterogeneous with respect to contributions, are 
homogeneous with respect to the common goal (Olson 1965; Williamson 1975; 
Agarwal et al. 2010). Governance should ensure that once some members made 
contributions, others will not simply freely benefit from it but instead follow suit 
(Araujo et al. 2003). In addition only new members that increase current 
members’ gains should be allowed. It is important that gains resulting from 
cooperation are distributed in a way that is perceived as procedurally just (Luo 
2008; Kumar 1996). However, formal institutions are weakly developed in the 
world’s least developed countries. Even if formal institutions are ratified, 
enforcement often is still a problem. While this can be partially overcome by 
informal institutions, the larger the group gets, the more difficult it becomes to 
rely on informal institutions (Beverland 2007; Dolfsma and Van der Eijk 2010; 
Hoskisson et al. 2000; Luo 2008; Mesquita and Lazzarini 2008; Olson 1965; 




The World Bank (2007) lists different challenges that collectives in developing 
countries face. Some of these challenges violate the conditions for success of 
collective action. A first is the conflict between efficiency and equity: “Producer 
organizations typically operate in the context of rural communities where they 
are subject to norms and values of social inclusion and solidarity. This may clash 
with the requirements of professional, business-oriented organizations that must 
help members compete to survive in the market place. In the name of inclusion, 
organizations have difficulty excluding members who do not comply with 
obligations. In the name of solidarity, they are pressed to cross-subsidize poorer-
performing members at the expense of better performers, thereby weakening 
rewards for efficiency and innovation. They are also frequently pressed to deliver 
public goods to the community, putting a drain on their resources.” (World Bank 
2007: 155). Another problem is the heterogeneity in terms of members and their 
goals and positions within collectives, serving the interests of some over the 
interests of others. Collectives are furthermore constrained by limited 
managerial capacity, and weak institutional environments (World Bank 2007). 
In other words, though cooperatives have much potential in theory, in practice 
they are confronted with serious challenges. In the current chapter we are one of 
the first to quantify access to and usage of input factors by members and non-
members of cooperatives and study efficiency in their usage.  
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is one of the world’s least developed countries, ranking place 173 on the 
human development index. In pursuit of economic growth the country’s strategy 
is to invest in development of the agricultural sector by means of, among other 
things, stimulating membership of farmer cooperatives by small-scale farmers. 
The proven relevance of farmer cooperatives in different parts of the world forms 
the basis on which the country’s strategic direction in what is called the “growth 
and transformation plan” is based. Nonetheless the country suffers from an 
institutional environment that falls short in creating incentives for collective 
action. The government currently pursues a strategy to organize all farmers in 
one cooperative per village. According to law no two (or more) cooperatives with a 
certain purpose may be established in a village. The government interferes in the 
establishment and management of cooperatives, because of which almost all 
cooperatives are so-called ‘multi-purpose cooperatives’. Since these cooperatives 
cover basically every thinkable purpose, there is no more space for other 
cooperatives, and even if there were such space, the government would not 
provide permission for its establishment. Cooperatives are furthermore expected 
to bring benefits not only to members, but to the wider community as well. In 
other words, on the spectrum of private goods, club goods, and public goods, 
services provided by the cooperative are seen more as public goods than as club 




priority to members over non-members when renting out the tractor but instead 
rents out the tractor on a first-come-first-served basis, even though the tractor is 
(indirectly) paid by the members. Similarly in informal meetings leaders of 
cooperatives are persuaded to buy fertilizer from the state-owned monopolist and 
sell it to farmers in the village. In practice this meant that in the years in which 
we were collecting data cooperatives used profits made from trading in members’ 
produce not to distribute it to members in forms of cash (dividend) but to trade in 
fertilizer. The risky nature of this business became apparent when a cooperative 
only succeeded in selling the fertilizer to farmers when it reduced the selling 
price to 10% of the price it had paid to the state-owned monopolist. While the 
cooperative engages in risky investments farmers can become member (and 
hence co-owner of the cooperative’s assets) for less than US$ 3.00.  
The number of implications that the regulations have on entrepreneurial 
behavior are numerous and the list is much longer than the few examples 
mentioned above. However, what it illustrates is that farmers who are ambitious 
and make efficient use of their input factors are discouraged to participate in the 
cooperative. Despite the potential of collective action, if the goals of the 
cooperative do not align with the goals of the ambitious farmer, then the 
ambitious farmer most likely does not benefit from membership. Forming a 
cooperative with similarly ambitious other farmers, on the other hand, is not 
allowed in Ethiopia.  
The importance of cooperating with other farmers with similar ambitions is 
illustrated by a cooperative called Humera 2 in the area where we collected data. 
We did not include its members in our sample, because of the 17 members only 3 
are sesame seed farmers, which is a too small number to conduct statistical 
analyses. Nonetheless it is clear from studying this cooperative using case study 
methods that they meet all requirements for success of collective action. The 
cooperative was formed shortly after the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war over a 
decade ago. They started with a group of 18 farmers of whom 17 are still member. 
They made clear regulations about (heterogeneous) contributions everyone had to 
make in kind and in cash, the development of the share price, sharing of 
revenues, investment plans, et cetera. No new members were accepted and share 
prices increased from 3,000 Ethiopian Birr at inception to 50,000 Ethiopian Birr 
during the last interview (as compared to 50 Ethiopian Birr for regular 
cooperatives). Sanctions on free-riding behavior were formulated and revenues 
were supposed to benefit group members in the first place rather than the wider 
community. They did not abide by the Ethiopian regulations and were able to 
circumvent these regulations because of their status as former fighters of the 
liberation front that toppled the former military regime in 1991 and forms the 
country’s government since then. Currently the cooperative engages in a wide 




example illustrates that if farmers want to be more profitable, they need to 
cooperate with like-minded others. 
Nonetheless, in order to stimulate cooperative membership (of the one 
cooperative in a village), cooperatives are given a few privileges, of which tax 
exemptions and possibilities to sell produce via the Ethiopia Commodity 
Exchange and, or, to export produce directly, are the most important ones. In 
Ethiopia an auction hall called the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX) has 
been institutionalized for the trade of different crops, including the country’s two 
most important crops in terms of revenues, namely coffee and sesame seed. In 
order to deliver to the ECX the seller needs to provide at least 50 quintals. 
Individual small-scale coffee and sesame seed farmers normally do not reach 
such quantities. This implies that farmers can only sell via the ECX if they 
cooperate with other farmers. Given the high fees to become member of the ECX, 
a large group is needed in order to earn back these costs. Some cooperatives did 
become member of the ECX and hence can sell via the ECX at any time. In 
addition different cooperatives are organized jointly in a separate entity called 
the Union. The Union has organizational assets in the form of management, 
language and accounting skills, network, and the like, to be able to engage in 
export, where individual cooperatives lack such capacity. This means that 
cooperatives and their members have two additional sales outlets as compared to 
non-members: The ECX and the (exporting) Union. The two additional sales 
outlets can benefit members of cooperatives because non-members can only sell 
sesame to spot-market traders (who in turn sell via the ECX). Selling via the 
ECX or to the Union by cooperatives brings major benefits as compared to selling 
to spot market traders. Firstly spot market traders are abundantly present short 
after the harvesting season in all villages (i.e. late October). Yet, as time goes by, 
the number of spot market traders reduces quickly, particularly after December. 
Lack of spot market traders reduces the bargaining power and increases the 
transaction costs of farmers who sell to these traders. This is highly different for 
the ECX. The auction floor at the ECX is open all year round. In addition 
payments always follow within two days after sellers sold sesame via the ECX. 
Quick payment is realized because buyers of sesame (Ethiopian exporters located 
in Addis Ababa) first need to deposit an amount of money before they can buy 
sesame. The amount of sesame they are allowed to buy depends on the amount of 
money that they deposited. Sellers can thus rest assured that, given that there 
are buyers, they can sell anytime via the ECX if they like the price. The ECX 
records the daily prices of sesame and from these data we learn that in the year 
in which we collected data the price of sesame increased gradually from around 
2,000 Ethiopian Birr per quintal (depending on quality; the local measuring 
standard of 1 quintal equals 100 kilogram) just after the harvest (i.e. late 




increased by 75%. The Union even bypasses Ethiopian buyers (i.e. exporters) of 
sesame when they sell sesame directly to an importing firm. If this is arranged 
throughout the year, members of cooperatives can benefit from this as well. 
Given the privileges of cooperatives together with restrictive institutions being 
imposed on them it remains ambiguous what the net benefits are to members. 
While the government creates disincentives for those pursuing effective 
deployment of input factors, membership may allow benefiting from direct export 
and access to the ECX. 
3.3 Data and Methods 
We collected data among sesame farmers in a county called Kafta-Humera in the 
Northwest of the region Tigray. The county borders Sudan and Eritrea. It is a 
drought-prone hot area where only two crops can grow well given the traditional 
rain-fed agricultural practices that are still employed: sorghum and sesame seed. 
A tractor used for plowing is the only non-traditional aspect of farming in this 
area. We collected data among 375 small-scale sesame seed farmers of whom 
approximately half is member of a cooperative and half is not. We chose to collect 
data in the Northwest of Ethiopia because many cooperatives in this region are 
established around the same time, namely some six to seven years after the 
DERG regime had been toppled by liberation fronts. The region Tigray, in the 
North of Ethiopia, formed the scenery where the worst fights against the military 
regime took place. Consequently, for a long time, soils were not exploited fully for 
agricultural purposes. It was not until after that war that more farmers started 
to come to the Northwest of Ethiopia to start farming sesame and sorghum. Later 
on they also established cooperatives. The setting provides a good place for 
collecting data on the use of input factors and profits generated since many 
farmers only produce sesame. Sesame is a cash crop solely produced for the 
generation of profits. Except for some sowing seed and some sesame for luxury 
hotels in the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, all sesame is exported. Sesame 
is not a food crop used for home consumption. Sesame farming furthermore 
involves the outsourcing of certain activities such as plowing by someone with a 
tractor and weeding by migrant laborers. Since not all activities are carried out 
by the farmer himself, high costs are incurred prior to selling the produce. 
Overall farmers have strong incentives to obtain the highest agronomical yields 
and price as possible. 
Variables  
In the current study we employ a novel methodology in which we go beyond the 
three traditional input factors in agricultural economics studies (land, labor, and 
capital) to add more detail to variances existent in farmer inputs and hence 
explain with greater specificity variance in farmers’ profits. We collected 




explain higher or lower profits. We conducted 131 interviews with stakeholders of 
the sesame seed supply chain and held two focus group discussions with industry 
experts in order to identify critical input factors. In total we identified eight input 
factors that can explain variances in profits. We studied in what respects the 
eight input factors vary and used these ways in which the input factors vary to 
ask objective data to farmers in the questionnaires. As such we obtained highly 
specific data for each of the respondents concerning their farming practices. The 
input factors are listed below as well as with the ways in which each of these 
input factors vary: 
 Plowing and sowing 
o Number of times of plowing 
o Time of sowing 
o Type of seeds used 
 Weeding 
o Weeding after flowering in the previous year 
o Number of times of weeding 
o Time of weeding 
 Harvesting 
o Time of harvesting 
 Storage 
o Floor materials 
o Wall materials 
o Roof materials 
o House or not 
o Plastic shelter on the field or not 
 Labor 
o Provisions to hired laborers (food, water, shelter, et cetera) 
o Repeated contracts with hired laborers 
o Number of household members working on the farm 
 Location 
o One of the ‘favored’ locations 
o Soil quality 
o Distance between the respondent’s home and field 
o Distance from the respondent to a large-scale farmer 
 Time of selling 
o Generally speaking the later the better 
 Number of animals (as proxy for capital) 
o Generally speaking the more the better 
 
Plowing and sowing is important for both the agronomical yield and quality. 
Plowing is done preferably three times (although many farmers plow only once), 
and sowing is done preferably in the first week of the second period (of two 
periods) of rainfall, using improved rather than traditional seeds. Farmers do 
often not follow these rules because they are not aware or because they do not 




time of sowing is, but did not sow at that time we asked why they did not do that. 
Often they replied that there was a lack of machinery (i.e. tractors and plowing 
machines for rent) or lack of capital (renting a tractor is most expensive during 
peak demand). 
Similarly there is a variety in the way farmers weed and harvest, which are also 
important input factors  to improve agronomical yield and quality and to manage 
rainfall. Storage is important to prevent theft, damage on the crop resulting from 
humidity, and lost harvest because of strong winds. Capital can help farmers 
attract the right machinery and labor at the right time in order to plow, sow, 
weed, and harvest as desired. Since the small-scale farmers in Kafta-Humera 
have no bank account and are typically unwilling to share information on the 
amount of capital they have, we use the number of animals as a proxy for capital. 
Animals such as goats, sheep, oxen, donkeys, and camels often function as the 
savings accounts of farmers who do not have bank accounts. In bad sesame 
production years, animals can be sold, while in good sesame production years 
animals will reproduce. Animals can function as collateral when obtaining loans 
and allow farmers to take more risks (in the hope of higher returns) when 
farming. Labor is important in order to obtain good quality and agronomical 
yields and to avoid theft. Careful weeding is important in order not to damage 
the crop, yet as many weeds have to be removed as possible in order to give the 
crop the space to grow well. Location is important because of soil fertility, 
capacity of land to avoid water-logging, proximity to asphalt roads and proximity 
to large-scale farmers and the farmers’ homes. Farmers can live up to 80 
kilometers from their fields. Proximity to large-scale farmers is important 
because large-scale farmers own tractors and plowing machines. Given their 
ownership of these machines they will plow sufficiently and at the right times. 
Bordering fields of small-scale farmers can, if paid for, relatively easy be included 
in the plowing and sowing process of large-scale farmers. Finally, the time of 
selling is important in order to obtain a high price. Generally speaking the price 
is lowest just after harvest time and increases gradually throughout the following 
year.  
For each of the input factors we determined with the industry experts during the 
focus group discussions how to rate their variances. Most of the input factors 
were given a score ranging from 1 to 5, except for the number of animals and 
time of selling, for which the actual number of animals is used as continuous 
variable and the actual average time of selling as well. Farmers sometimes sell 
their produce in different batches at different periods of time and therefore the 
average is taken. It is argued that, in general, the more animals the better and 




The above list illustrates that each of the input factors consists of 1-5 different 
items which can each vary again. Though each of the items is given a score of 1-5 
we decided not to measure the items independently but make composite 
measures instead. The main reason lies in the argumentation of the focus group 
discussants who argued that the composited items cannot be seen independently. 
The items of each of the input factors are interrelated and affect the efficiency of 
the input factor. Consider for example plowing and sowing. The timing of sowing 
is important, but the extent to which farmers benefit from the time of sowing 
depends on what seeds are sown and in what soil (i.e. how many times is it 
plowed?). Plowing and sowing go inseparably together. Sowing is done 
simultaneously with plowing. The interesting feature of composite measures is 
that with greater specificity distinctions are made between those farmers who 
perform well on  all items versus those who perform well on only one or two. In 
other words the group that scores 5 for time of sowing is larger than the group of 
farmers that score 5 for each of the three items. Hence we distinguish those 
farmers who exploit the best time for sowing by making use of sowing the right 
seeds in well-plowed soils from those who do not and expect this to improve the 
linear relationship. We also ran regression analyses without the composite 
measures and indeed the R2 and the number of significant coefficients was much 
lower. The composite measures add specificity because all of the composite 
measures except storage (for which there is a clear continuum from score 1 to 
score 5) consist of one or two items that can have only two or three values (1 and 
5 or 1, 3, and 5). As such these items give a positive (score 5) or negative (score 1) 
weight to the other item(s) which can have all integer values from 1-5. Since 
those items for which there are only two or three values are typically 
significantly positively skewed, those respondents who score well on each of the 
items is clearly a smaller group than those who score well on only 1 of them. 
There are, for example, two types of seeds that can be used for sowing: the 
traditional and the improved variety. The vast majority of farmers uses the 
traditional seed and are given a score 1, while the others receive a score 5. 
Because of these two options the group of respondents who score a 5 for the time 
of sowing is divided into two groups: one that additionally scores a 5 for the type 
of seeds used and one that does not. 
In order to avoid lengthiness, we will describe only one of the six variables for 
which we calculated scores ranging from 1 to 5. The scores of other input factors 
are calculated in similar ways. 
Example: Plowing and Sowing 
We already identified that for plowing and sowing the number of times of plowing 
is important, the timing of sowing, and the type of seed used. All this affects both 
quality and quantity (agronomical yield). From the focus group discussions we 




most important, followed by the number of times of plowing, and finally the type 
of seed used. 
We also know from the focus group discussions and the interviews with industry 
experts that generally speaking there are seven moments on which farmers can 
sow (time of sowing). The right time depends on the rainfall. After a dry period of 
around 7 to 8 months, it starts raining in Kafta-Humera. The first rainfall 
usually takes about two weeks. After these two weeks it is dry for a short period 
of time and then it starts raining again for about 3 – 4 months. The best time to 
sow is in the first week of the second period of rainfall because the moist soil 
together with sufficient new rainfall allows the seed to germinate and grow well. 
The risk of sowing earlier is that the period between the first and second rainfall 
takes long which may the seed cause to germinate and then die. However, the 
seed should not be sowed too late either since this would prevent the crop to 
mature before the dry season starts and too much humidity can make the seed 
‘drown’. We asked farmers objectively when they sowed the seeds. The answer 
was coded using seven options: 
1. Before the first rainfall 
2. In the first week of the first rainfall 
3. In the second week of the first rainfall 
4. Between the first and second rainfall 
5. In the first week of the second rainfall 
6. In the second week of the second rainfall 
7. After the second week of the second rainfall. 
 
For this part of plowing and sowing respondents would get a score 5 if the answer 
was code 4, a score 4 if the answer was code 3, a score 3 if the answer was code 2, 
a score 2 if the answer was code 4, 6, or 7, and a score 1 if the answer was code 1.  
Plowing is preferably done three times. The minimum is one time, since sowing is 
done simultaneously with plowing. So for this part of plowing and sowing farmers 
scored a 5 if they plowed 3 times, a 3 if they plowed 2 times, and a 1 if they 
plowed only once.  
Finally, there are two types of seeds: the traditional seed and the improved seed. 
The improved seed is said to result in better yields and better resistance to 
drought. If farmers used the improved seed they would get a score 5, otherwise a 
score 1. 
Next we had to come to one score for plowing and sowing. Given the varying 
importance of the three different parts we did not just add the three scores and 
divided them by 3. Instead we multiplied the score for the timing of sowing by 3, 




seed used was not multiplied. We added the multiplied scores and the score for 
the type of seed used and divided by 6.  
In this way we asked questions about farmer’s variances in farming inputs in an 
objective way while interpreting the results using the qualitative data. 
In addition to the predictor variables we included four control variables in the 
analysis: 1) village, 2) age of the firm, 3) (il)literacy, and 4) cooperative 
membership (for the whole sample). The outcome variable was measured as the 
profit per hectare. Since the outcome variable measures profit per hectare, farm 
size is already accounted for in the outcome variable and therefore not included 
as control variable. 
The survey was pilot tested from December 2012 to January 2013. From March 
to May 2013 survey data were collected using the final version of the survey. 
3.4 Analysis and results 
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. First we compare member farmers 
to non-members in terms of their performance and access to input factors. Using 
simple mean comparison tests we analyze whether there are significant 
differences in the resource endowments of farmers across these two groups and if 
average profitability differs. However, because membership in cooperatives is not 
random, profitability differences are likely to be biased. As we will document both 
groups do not have similar access and endowments of resources. Therefore, we 
continue to test profitability differences based on propensity score matching. 
Propensity score matching allows yielding more realistic estimates of the impact 
of cooperative-membership on profitability by finding comparable non-members.  
In the second part, we continue to analyze how the two groups make use of the 
input factors. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression we compare the 
relationships between input-factor endowment and profitability for member 
farmers and non-members. The coefficients inform us how an increase in input 
factors increases profits per hectare for members and non-members. In order to 
test for the effect of membership on slope differences we also report linear 
hypothesis tests for the differences in slopes for each of the input factors. 
Input factor endowment and profitability of members and non-members of farmer 
cooperatives  
In Table 1 we provide the results of the two-sample t-tests comparing 
profitability and input factor differences for members and non-members. 
Interestingly, the profits that members and non-members make do not differ 
significantly from one another. However, there are some significant differences 
regarding the input factors. Members score significantly higher than non-




Animals. Concerning the other input factors there are no significant differences 
in the access to these input factors between members and non-members. These 
results suggest that non-members seem to be able to achieve similar levels of 
profits while having fewer input factors available to produce them.  
Table 1. Simple comparison of profits and input factors of member and non-members 
 Members Non-Members 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Sig.  
Profit per ha 3241 4798 3486 5152 .637 
Plowing & Sowing 2.6323 .6634 2.5234 .6685 .117 
Weeding 3.5226 .6672 3.3830 .6285 .040 
Harvesting 3.9698 .5938 3.9942 .5790 .692 
Storage 2.8442 1.435 2.3382 1.3134 .000 
Labor 1.8610 .3031 1.8377 .3033 .463 
Location 3.2312 .5607 3.1988 .5959 .592 
Animals 20.4646 31.0637 11.6667 35.9135 .012 
Time Selling 4.4149 4.4950 4.4858 4.7898 .884 
Note: Two-sided mean comparison test. The number of observations for members of cooperatives is 198 and the 
number of observations for non-members is 171. 
Since it is likely that the decision to join farmer cooperatives is not independent 
of the available input factors we also calculated the average treatment effect 
(ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) using propensity-
score matching. This allows us to compare profitability of members and non-
members that have similar endowment of factor inputs. In addition to matching 
members to non-members based on factor endowment we also consider the 
farmers’ location (proxied by the village) to match both groups. In our case the 
propensity-score matching estimator matches on the estimated treatment 
probabilities using a logit model. One of the central assumptions required to 
estimate the effect of membership on profits using propensity score matching is 
that each individual farmer has a positive probability of becoming member of a 
cooperative. To assure that this assumption is not violated Figure 1 plots the 
estimated densities of the probability of being member. This figure displays the 
estimated density of the predicted probabilities that a non-member farmer is a 
non-member and the estimated density of the predicted probabilities that a non-
member farmer is a member. Since both plots do not indicate too much 
probability mass near 0 or 1 and the estimated densities have most of the masses 
in areas in which they overlap we do not have evidence that the overlap 






Figure 1. Overlap graph 
 
Table 2 reports the average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATET). The ATE is the average effect of the treatment in 
the population, i.e.             , while the ATET is the average treatment 
effect among those that receive the treatment (                 , with t=1 
denoting the treatment group of members). In both cases we observe that 
membership in a farmer cooperative is negatively related to profits per hectare 
and that this negative effect turns out to be rather similar in effect size. However 
the ATET turns out to be only significant at the ten percent level. Our estimates 
indicate that if farmers that are members of cooperatives leave the cooperative 
and have to use the existing (and higher level) of inputs as efficient as the non-
members do, their profitability would increase by 1.350. This translates to 1,350 
Birr ≈ 53€ ≈ 68 US-$ per 1 hectare – based on the average prices in the period 
under investigation this implies an additional 75-100 kg of sesame per hectare. 


































-1.239 0.589 0.036 2.844 4.083 
Average 
treatment effect 
on the treated 
(ATET) 
-1.359 0.791 0.086 3.247 4.606 
 
Our results regarding the differences in factor endowments and profitability 
indicate that members of a cooperative have similar profitability then non-
members while employing more factor inputs. Once we compare farmers with 
similar levels of factor inputs, substantial differences in profitability between 
members and non-members are observed. This calls for a more fine-grained 
analysis how an increase in each of the relevant input factors relates to profits 
per hectare, both for farmers that are member and those that are not member of 
a cooperative. 
Utilization of input factors of members and non-members of farmer cooperatives 
In order to investigate how efficiently members and non-members of farmer 
cooperatives employ their resources we regress productivity on the set of 
production factors allowing for contingency between members and non-members 
by employing interaction terms between membership-status and each production 
factor. The results from this exercise are documented in Table 3. Next to the 
estimation results Table 3 also reports slope differences between members and 
non-members and whether these differences are significant. 
We observe that plowing and sowing, harvesting, storage, labor, and animals 
exhibit a positive relationship to profits for the group of non-members at the five 
percent level. In addition, for non-members, the coefficients for location, literacy, 
and experience in sesame farming turn out to be positive and significant at the 
ten percent level. For farmers that are member of cooperatives storage, labor, 
animals, time-selling, and literacy are positive and significant at the five percent 
level while plowing and sowing are positive and significant at the ten percent 
level only. Interestingly, we find for members of cooperatives with more 
experience in sesame farming lower profitability levels. 
The more informative insights of this exercise are the differences in the slopes 
between non-members and members. Such differences display dissimilarities in 
farmer’s utilization of input factors. A negative and significant difference in the 




possess to produce and market sesame, while a significant positive difference 
indicates that members have an advantage in employing a resource compared to 
non-members. 
We find that non-members are better able to utilize harvesting, labor, and 
location resources (slope differences significant at the five percent level). In 
addition there is some evidence that farming experience benefits non-members 
but not the members of cooperatives. Next, we also find some weak indication 
that storage capacities are employed more efficiently as well (slope differences 
significant at the ten percent level). For plowing and sowing, weeding, animals 
and literacy we do not find significant differences in the slopes of the two groups. 
Members are better able to utilize the benefits resulting from speculating on 
price, or ‘time of selling’. 
As a robustness check to the average treatment effect reported in the previous 
section we also calculated the predicted values assuming no farmer being 
member of a cooperative and contrast this predicted values assuming all farmers 
belong to a cooperative. The predicted values are reported in Table A3 in 
appendix (A) and are rather close to the potential outcome for membership and 





Table 3. Regression results (Dependent variable profit per hectare in 1,000 ETB) 





Non-Members  0.579** -0.0315 
 (0.0294) (0.0197) 
Members 0.547*  
 (0.0491)  
Weeding Non-Members  -0.265 0.118 
 (0.124) (0.0597) 
Members -0.147  
 (0.0643)  
Harvesting Non-Members  1.094** -1.0616** 
 (0.0453) (0.0844) 
Members 0.0320  
 (0.0392)  
Storage Non-Members  0.946** -0.2074* 
 (0.0174) (0.0239) 
Members 0.738***  
 (0.00652)  
Labor Non-Members  5.385*** -1.521** 
 (0.0450) (0.0583) 
Members 3.864***  
 (0.0133)  
Location Non-Members  1.434* -1.3201** 
 (0.133) (0.0618) 
Members 0.114  
 (0.0708)  
Animals Non-Members  0.0279** -0.00953 
 (0.00141) (0.00231) 
Members 0.0184**  
 (0.000895)  
Time Selling Non-Members  0.111 0.213** 
 (0.0202) (0.00689) 
Members 0.324**  
 (0.0134)  
Literacy Non-Members  0.798* 0.0909 
 (0.0676) (0.0662) 
Members 0.889***  




Non-Members  0.0653* -0.121** 
 (0.0103) (0.00321) 
Members -0.0554*  
 (0.00708)  
Cooperative   11.10**  
membership  (0.553)  
Constant  -20.75***  
  (0.208)  
Village fixed 
effects 
 Yes  
Observations  367  
R-squared  0.311  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered across 
membership status. Δ Non-Members/Members reports contrasts of marginal linear predictions in the slope 





Members and non-members reach comparable profit-levels that do not differ 
significantly, yet do so in different ways. Assuming similar input factors non-
members are expected to outperform members significantly. This is an important 
and interesting finding based on rigorous data that can shed light on why so 
many cooperatives in Africa fail to utilize their potential (see World Bank 2007). 
Our data suggest that farmers as collectives have difficulties in exploiting the 
input factors to which they have better access than non-members. It is only 
because of the exploitation of one input factor, namely selling late in the season, 
that profit-levels between members and non-members do not differ significantly. 
If non-members were not constrained by the absence of spot-market traders or 
the minimum delivery quantity of 50 quintals by the ECX, non-members would 
perform much better than members. Reversing this statement we can argue that 
if members of cooperatives would be able to make as efficient use of the input 
factors plowing and sowing, harvesting, storage, labor, location, and number of 
animals as non-members their profit would be much  larger.  
Speculating on price fluctuations is a common tactic in the agribusiness industry. 
We can learn from the data that speculating on price can also be highly lucrative 
to farmers. More interesting, however, is that only members benefit from this 
tactic. This is not only the result of productive outcomes of collective action, but 
also the consequence of the subsidization by the Ethiopian State of the ECX. An 
important question is why farmers fail to exploit the theoretical potential of 
collective action. The explanation most likely has to be found in intra-group 
heterogeneity and relatedly selection mechanisms for cooperative membership, 
similar to previous discussions such as by the World Bank (2007). The costs and 
benefits of heterogeneity are highly debated in collective action literature. As 
mentioned before, heterogeneity with respect to complementary inputs is 
required in order to create synergy effects, but homogeneity is required with 
respect to the collective goal. The current institutional fabric in Ethiopia does not 
allow for more than one cooperative per village (except for a handful of privileged 
farmers, such as former fighters). The cooperative is also considered to be more a 
provider of public goods rather than club goods. This may result in free-riding 
and other forms of opportunistic behavior as well as little incentives to invest and 
take risks. Farmers can choose to become member of a cooperative that is a 
melting pot of members heterogeneous with respect to goals or choose not to 
become a member. As a direct consequence of the problems of collective action the 
efficiency with which input factors are utilized may reduce, which explains why 
members make less efficient use of the input factors. Another complementary 
explanation is that the institutional fabric creates incentives for those farmers 
who do know how to make efficient use of input factors not to become member. 




farmers the possibility to benefit from selling late in the season may not be 
sufficient reason to join the cooperative. Most farmers sell (part of) their produce 
right or shortly after the harvest in order to repay loans with excessive interest 
rates. Only richer farmers who do not borrow money and have excess capital to 
live without selling sesame short after the harvest for a while can benefit from 
selling later in the season. Indeed, when we consider the number of animals as a 
proxy for capital, we see from the t-test that member farmers are significantly 
richer than non-members. The number of animals often represents the savings 
accounts of poor rural families who do not have bank accounts. In times of 
successful harvests animals can reproduce, whereas in times of bad harvests 
animals can be sold in order to cover daily expenditures. 
The cooperative does not seem to provide instruments to increase the efficiency of 
the utilization of input factors by members. This could be explained by the 
perspective on cooperatives in Ethiopia as organizations that provide public 
rather than club goods. Unless contributions result in rents that can be 
appropriated by the members, contributions (investments) are unlikely to be 
made and hence growth opportunities are constrained. It should therefore not 
come as a big surprise that the cooperatives fail to provide instruments for 
efficient utilization of input factors. 
3.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
Collective action provides small farmers in theory the potential to benefit from 
jointly created and utilized input factors. Nonetheless, as the World Bank (2007) 
and others argue, the theoretical potential often remains unrealized in 
developing countries. With a rigorous quantitative study we confirmed and added 
depth to what the World Bank (2007: 155) wrote in the 2008 World Development 
Report: “In the name of inclusion, organizations have difficulty excluding 
members who do not comply with obligations. In the name of solidarity, they are 
pressed to cross-subsidize poorer-performing members at the expense of better 
performers, thereby weakening rewards for efficiency and innovation. They are 
also frequently pressed to deliver public goods to the community, putting a drain 
on their resources.” Similarly in the current chapter we argue that the absent 
possibility for farmers to join other farmers with similar goals results in collective 
action problems that reduces the efficiency of farmers’ utilization of input factors 
and creates incentives for others not to join the cooperative. Farmers are often 
considered to be homogeneous and hence it is often thought that any group of 
farmers producing a certain crop can cooperate. However, we conclude that for 
collective action to succeed farmers need to work together with others who have 
similar ambitions. We already demonstrated that the access to and utilization of 
input factors varies among farmers despite their homogeneity. Similarly we can 




goals, their aspirations as well. Small business management literature 
distinguishes entrepreneurial small business owners from managerial business 
owners. The former are more innovative, risk-taking, and pro-active than the 
latter and hence are often the ones realizing high growth of new firms (Wiklund, 
Patzelt, and Shepherd 2009; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Chen, Greene, and Crick 
1998). Similarly aspirations between farmers, as small-business owners, will 
differ, particularly between those who are pre-dominantly driven by necessity 
and those who are pre-dominantly driven by opportunity to engage in farming 
(Naudé 2010; Carsrud and Brännback 2011). 
Policy implications 
Our findings do neither make us suggest members to quit the cooperative nor 
non-members to become member in case benefits arising from speculating on 
price outweigh efficiency losses of input factors. The most important reason is 
that such a recommendation would not tackle the problems where they originate, 
namely in the perception of policy makers that farmers are homogeneous. Their 
heterogeneity in terms of skills, entrepreneurial intent (goals), innovativeness, 
risk-taking propensity, trustworthiness, et cetera, is ignored. Currently there are 
no opportunities for farmers who know how to utilize input factors efficiently to 
benefit from collective action. Available options are not attractive to them and 
they are prevented from creating other options. A first policy recommendation 
therefore is to allow free organization by farmers and support them in working 
together with similarly ambitious others. Success factors of collective action need 
to be well understood and the ostensible homogeneity of commodity producers is 
not a criteria for grouping them. Criteria for grouping should be based on farmer 
goals. Secondly a policy recommendation is to allow all farmers to benefit from 
speculating on price. Speculating on price is a common tactic in agribusiness, but 
often not done by farmers. However, as the results show, farmers can benefit 
highly from speculating on price. A policy recommendation therefore is to aim for 
inclusion of all farmers, independent of cooperative membership, in the 
commodity exchange. Relatedly a policy recommendation is to provide low-
interest loans to farmers. Low-interest loans would reduce the necessity for 
farmers to sell their sesame directly or shortly after the harvest. A third policy 
recommendation would be to consider cooperatives as organizations delivering 
club goods rather than public goods. We find from the data that the cooperative 
does not result in any output increasing the efficient utilization of members’ 
input factors. To reverse this inefficiency, benefits from investments should be 
accrued to members rather than the wider community. This policy 
recommendation does not only concern the Ethiopian governmental policy 
makers, but policy makers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well. 
From primary and secondary data we learned that NGOs often considered 




NGOs invest in gender equality in cooperatives, the provision of schools and 
education by cooperatives, and the inclusion of the poorest of the poor, among 
other things. While these are all highly noble and important objectives to pursue, 
cooperatives are not the vehicles to realize these objectives. When NGOs use a 
millennium-development-goal-agenda when supporting cooperatives women may 
lead cooperatives in a culture that does not accept female authority, investments 
by members may be demotivated because profits are spent on public goods, and 
the inclusion of weak members may dilute profits per existing member and hence 
motivation. Even among scholars inclusion of the poorest of the poorest farmers 
in cooperatives is considered important for poverty alleviation without 
understanding how this all-inclusiveness may constrain entrepreneurial behavior 
(Bernard and Spielman 2009; Fischer and Qaim 2012). While we do not advocate 
against supporting the poorest of the poor, we do argue that these farmers only 
should become member of a cooperative which’ goals align with their individual 
goals. Successful cooperatives may ultimately bring the outcomes that many 
NGOs target directly: improved income may lead to improved sanitation, access 
to healthcare and education, tax payments, et cetera (cf. Van Lieshout, Went, and 
Kremer 2010). Tobias, Mair, and Barbosa-Leiker (2013) refer to certain processes 
as “transformative entrepreneuring.” To improve competitiveness cooperatives 
and their supporting organizations need to search for the best fit between the 
cooperative’s input factors, market demands, and member and group aspirations.  
Further research 
We suggest further research to study in greater depth how collaborative 
agreements between firms succeed in bundling and creating input factors in 
order to gain insights from best practices. We also suggest further research on 
the effects of the institutional environment on the performance of firms in 
developing countries. An important question is how firms and entrepreneurs 
maneuver amidst restrictive official and officious institutions in an effort to gain 
and sustain a competitive advantage. We furthermore suggest further research 
on how aid organizations can contribute to the competitiveness of farmer 
organizations. Studies on the effects of what is called “aid for trade” are currently 
in a stage of infancy (cf. Brazys 2013; Calì and Te Velde 2011; Nowak-Lehmann, 
Martínez-Zarzoso, Klasen, and Herzer 2009; Schulpen 2002). To date these 
studies focused on bilateral and multilateral aid rather than non-governmental 
aid. In addition the focus has been on the effects of aid on export, but export 
cannot be held synonymous to competitiveness. Which market is best to target for 
firms from developing countries depends on the fit between the market’s 
demands, and the firm’s input factors, capabilities, and aspirations. In 
development, political economy, and economic geography research there is often a 
‘market myopia’ in the sense that high-value markets in the West are considered 




whether there is a fit between what a market demands and what a firm can offer. 
We therefore suggest further research on this topic. 
  
